STEVENS V. THE STATE OF INDIANA.

In the wording of the clause of termination it would be advisable not to subject it to the construction that an estate fcr
life has been given, which upon the happening of bankruptcy
or insolvency is defeated, but to throw the clause into the form
of what is called a collateral limitation, as for instance the interest is given for life, or until bankruptcy, or insolvency, or
judgment upon a creditor's bill.
All voluntary gifts should include, during the life of .the
donor, the right of revocation. This saves to the donor a right
to withdraw his bodnty when it becomes apparent, as is often
the case, that he is mistaken in the object of his gift.
A. M.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
STEVENS V. THE STATE OF INDIANA.
Upon an Indictment for murder where the defense isiisanltythe juryshould
-acquit if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to the soundness of mind of the
-prisonerat the time of the homicide, although they believe he had Judgment
.and reason sufficient to discriminate between right and wrong in the ordinary
affairs of life. He is as much entitled to the benefit of a doubt on thatasonany
,other material faet in the case.
An instruction that "if the Jury believe that the defendant knew the differ
ence between right and wrong in respect to the act in question; if he was conscious that such act was one which he ought not to do," he was responsible for
his act, is erroneous.

THIs was an appeal from the Vigo criminal court. The
appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree, and convicted. The defense was insanity. At the instance of the
prosecuting attorney, the court instructed the jury that "in
order to excuse a man from killing another, on the ground of
insanity, it must appear to the satisfaction of the jury that he
was either absolutely insane at the time of the act, so that he
did not know the difference between right or wrong, or that he
was laboring under some form of monomania by which he was
irresistibly impelled by an uncontrollable will to the perpetration of the act; but such monomania must be in relation to the
art of killing for if it is monomania upon some other suiject,
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it does not excuse a killing. If a man becomes a monomaniac

on account of the morbid state of his domestic affections, or if
he becomes so on account of the morbid state of his religious
feelings, in either case his moral sense is only affected by the
cause of his disease; that is he is only excused from the commission of crime so far as he acts under the irresistible influence
of thd particular monomania under which he is laboring; and
if,although laboring under either of said forms of monomania,
he shall kill a man with premeditation, malice and purpose, he
would be without excuse, and would be giilty of murder in the

first degree."
"In order to excuse a man for the commission of crime on
the ground of monomania, it must appearthat the monomania
had relation to the particular crime committed, and ifit was
monomania upon any other subject, it would be no excuse."
"When a man kills another without having given anyprevious

indicationsof insanity,and afterward so act as to appear to be
insane, the jury should consider this fact to determine whether
insanity is not stimulated br pretended; and if they find it
was pretended, it should not weigh anything in their decision
of the question of guilt or innocence."
At the request of the defendant, the jury were instructed
that "if they believed from the evidence thatwhen the prisoner
committed the act charged in the indictment, he was laboring
under any irresistible and uncontrollable mental delusion,
impelling him to said act-that he was at the time of the
perpetration of said killing in such a state of mind as to be
unable to control his will and his actions in regard to the act
so committed-then in judgment of law he was insane, and
could not be guilty of the offense of murder charged in the
indictment, and he is consequently entitled to a verdict of not
guilty."
"If the jury believes from the evidence that at the time of
committing the act charged in the indictment, the prisoner was
moved thereto by an insane impulse controlling his will and
his judgment-an impulse too powerful for him to resist -and
said insane impulse arose from causes physical or moral, or
from both combined, not voluntarily induced by himsell, under
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such circumstances the jury cannot find the defendant guilty
as charged."
The defendant asked the following instructions : that "if the
jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the soundness of the mind
of the prisoner at the time of the commission of the homicide
charged, he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, as he would
be to the benefit of a doubt as to any other material fact in the
case-it being, under the statute of this State, a necessary ingredient of the offense that the person charged shall, at the time
of the commission of the offense, be of sound mind, and if the
evidence shows that the prisoner, at the time of the commission
of the act, was not of such sound mind, although the jury may
believe he had judgment and reason sufficient to discriminate
between right and wrong in the ordinary affairs of life even at
the time of the commission of the offense, they cannot find him
guilty." The court refused to give the instruction,*as asked,
but over the objection of the defendant, gave it with this qualification: "If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the
defendant knew the difference between right and wrong in
respect to the act in question; if he was conscious that such
act was one which he ought not to do; and if 'that act, at the
same time, was contrary to the law of the State, then he is
responsible for his act."
There was a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
parts of the charge in italics were erroneous, and that the
qualification of the instructions asked by the defendant was
incorrect. The new trial was refused, and defendant appealed
to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREGORY, J.-It is undoubtedly the law as charged by the
court below, that if the defendant was moved to the act by an
insane impulse controling his will and his judgment, then he
was not guilty of the crime charged. And if the defendant
was a monomaniac on any subject, it was wholly immaterial
upon what subject, so that the insane impulse led to the commission of the act.
It is claimed that the instructions as to this point given by
the court, at tae in.stance of the State's attorney, were calculated
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to mislead the jury; and two members of this court are of that
opinion. It is clear that the instructions might have been put
in a better form, but I have no doubt that they are -correct
law, as they were intended by the court to be understood, and
particularly as explained by the court in the instructions asked
by the defendant. But if this case turned upon that question,
I should hesitate to determine that a jury might not have been
misled by instructions, about the meaning of which there is
a difference of opinion among the members of this court.
It is claimed that the court erred in the instruction in reference to simulating insanity after the comnission of the act, in
assuming that the defendant had given no previous indication
of insanity. There was some evidence of previous indication of
insanity, but we do not understand the instruction as making
any such assumption.
The instruction may not have been
applicable to the case made, and may have misled the jury.
But we are clear that the court below erred in giving the
qualification to the instruction asked by the defendant.
- The statute provides that "if any verson of sound mind
shall purposely and with premeditated malice kill any human
being, such person shall be deemed guilty~of murder in the
first degree:" 2 C. & H., p. 435, see. 2.
The legislature have defined the meaning of the expression
"person of sound mind." It is provided that this phrase
"shall be taken to mean any idiot, non compos, lunatic, monomaniac or distracted person:" 2 G. & H., pp. 573-4, sec. 1.
The great difficulty has been, in cases of partial insanity, to
fix the standard of criminal responsibility. The leading case
in this country is The Commonwealth v. Bodgers, 7 Metcalf
500. Chief Justice Sn:&w, in his charge to the jury in that
case, said: "The difficulty lies between those extremes in the
case of partial insanity, where the mind may be clouded and
weakened, but not incapable of remembering, reasoning and
judging, or so perverted by insane delusions as to act under
false impressions and influences. In these cases, the rule of
law, as we understand it, is this: A man is not to be excused
from responsibility, if he has capacity and reason sufficient to
enable him to distinguish between right and wrong as to the
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particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is then doing is wrong and criminal, and
will subject him to punishment. In order to be tesponsible,
he must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand
to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of right and justice, injurious to others, and a violation
of the dictates of duty. On the contrary, although he may be
laboring under partial insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its consequences ; if he has a
knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mentalpower
suff'ient to apply that knowledge to his own ease, and to know
that if he does the act he will do wrong-and receive punishment, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him
from responsibility for criminal acts."
As we understand this charge, it does not go the length of
fixing the test "of a knowledge of right and wrong." It recognizes the necessity of a mental power sufficient to apply that
knowledge, and act accordingly. The charge is by no means
clear, and we think that it is not entitled to the weight usually
awarded to it.
The law was much better put in Commonwealth ex rel. Haskell v. Haskell, Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer for Dec. 4,
1868, thus: "That the true test lies in the word power. Has
the defendant in a criminal case the power to distinguish right
from wrong, and the power to adhere to the right and avoid
the wrong? Has the defendant, in addition to the capacities
mentioned, the power to govern his mind, his body, and his
estate ?"
Indeed, there are very strong reasons for holding that the
3harge of Chief Justice PERLEY, in the State v. Pike (see
American Law Review for January, 1870, pp. 245-6), is the
true law on the subject. He instructed the jury "that the
verdict should be not guilty, by reason of insanity, if the killing
was the offspring or product of men tal disease in the defendant;
that neither delusion or knowledge of right and wrong, nor
aesign or cunning in planning and executing the killing and
escaping or avoiding detection,nor ability to recognize acquaint-
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ances, or to labor, or transact business, or manage affairs, is,
as a matter of law, a test of mental disease; but that all
symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters
of fact to be determined by the jury."
The argument that leads strongly to this conclusion is to be
found in the able dissenting opinion of Judge DOE, in Boardman
v. Woodman, 47 New Hampshire 120.

(See page 146, et 8e 7.

It is not necessary for us to go this length in the present
case. "
In a criminal case, the jury must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's mental capacity to commit
the crime charged. This is but an application of the general
principle, that the criminal intent must be proved, as well as
the act; that without a capable mind such intent cannot
exist, the very element of crime being wanting. Such terms
as " criminal intent," "vicious will" and "use of reason" are
used in a very broad and general sense, including the idea
that the mind must be in such a reasonable condition as to be
capable of giving a guilty character to the act. The will
does not join with the acts, and there is no guilt when the
act is directed or performed by a defective or vitiated understanding. So far as the person acts under the influence of
mental disease, he is not accountable.
We wish in this case to be understood as simply holding
that the qualification of the instruction asked by the defendant was not law, and for this reason the court below ought to
have granted the defendant a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
ELLiTT, J, was absent.
The exact point decided in this case
is that it is eroneous to instruct a
jury that "if the defendant knew the
difference between right and wrong
In respect to the act in question; if
he was eonscion that the act was one

Any one familiar with the English
decisions, nust be painfully conscious
how often this has been laid down as
the law in tlhat country during the past
half century.
Thus in Billingham's case, in 1812,

waich he ought not to do, then he is 5 C. & P. 169, Sir JA3s MANSFImD
in other declared that in order to support the
responsible for his act ;"
words, that such knowledge is the sole defense of insanity, it must be proved
1"by the most distinct and unquestion.
test of legal accountability
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able evidence that the prisoner was
incapable of judging between right
and wrong; in fact, it must be prdved
beyond all doubt, that at the time he
committed the atrociousact, he did not
consider that murder was a crime
against the laws of God and nature;

one. Mental incapacity of knowing
right from wrong would of course be
a de~ense, but the error lies in supposing that nothing but sueh incapacity
will sufflce. The latter no more follows from the former, than does the
conclusion that all animals are men

said in the celebrated case of McKaughtmn, that such was his test of
insanity: "he cared not what Judge
gave another teat, he should go to his
grave in the belief that this was the
real, sound and consistent test." This
was in 1843: 10 Clark & .inn. 200.
And this test is somewhat tenaciously
adhered to in the more recent cases in
England: see Regina v. Davies, 1 F.
& 1. 69; Regina v. Burton, 3 Id. 780;
Regina v. Leigh, 4 Id. 915: Regina

lectual test. And if man was all intellect, that might be sufficient. But
since he has emotions, passion, pro.
pensities, and, above all, a personal
will that may become deranged, the
intellectual test is not sufficient. I:
power to control his will is lost, not
through passion, not through a want
of desire to control it, but through
want of power,arising from a settled

v. Stokes, 3 C. A K. 185. And many
American courts have adopted the
same rule: see State v. Spencer, 1
Zabriskie 196; U. A v. Shult , 6 Mc.
Lean 121; State v. fHting, 21 MiS-

his conduct is as essential to criminal
liability as to moral responsibility:
see State v. Windsor, 5 Harrington 512;
Cbmmonwealth v. .osler, 4 Barr 267;
teWm'Is case, 2 Am. Journ. of Ins., Jan.

and that there was no other proof of because all men are animals. Capainsaniy which would ezcuse murder or city of knowing right from wrong is
any other crime." Lord BEoUG AM an intellectual test, purely an intel-

disease of the mind, then he is not

accountable. The power of choosing

souri 476; and many other cases. No 1861, p. 261: Sbott v. The Cbmonweatth,
doubt this is one test, but is it the only 4 Met. (Ky.) 227.

E. H. B.

Supreme Court of Wiscoisin.
JOHN C. SCHNEIDER V. WILLIAM S. EVANS.

Where the owner of goods delivers them to a carrier for transportation
through a number of separate but connecting lines, it ii, the general custom
for each carrier to pay the back charges for freight, and the last carrier has a
lien on the goods for the whole.
The first carrier guaranteed that the whole freight shouldnot exceed a stipulated sum. The second carrier paid the charges of the first in full, and at the
end of the route a lien was claimed for the whole freight, though it exceeded
the guaranteed amount: Held, that though the shipper would be entitled to
recover back the excess from the first carrier, yet the second carrier having
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paid the charge in the usual course of business and in ignorance of the guaranty
acquired a valid lien for the amount paid, and such lien passed to the subsequent cariers.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAINE, J.-There can be no doubtthat the contract between
the plaintiff and the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago
Railway Company was not what is commonly called a through
contract. That company did not undertake to carry the goods
to Hudson; on the contrary, it expressly restricted its liability as a carrier to its own route.
It did, however, guarantee on its behalf, and in behalf of the
other companies and carriers constituting the entire route, that
the through freight should not exceed a certain sum. But it
is a stipulated fact in the case, that each of the companies acted
independently, and that they did not form a continuous line
interested together in the transportation over the whole route.
It is clear therefore that each of the succeeding carriers, after
the first, had the right to charge its usual rates without regard
to the guarantee of the first company, even if this had been
known. This is not disputed. But the respondent's counsel
very ingeniously and forcibly urges that although this was so,
yet, when the succeeding companies decided to charge their
usual rates that rate diminished by the amount ofthe excess over
the guaranteed rate thereby caused, was the sum which the first
company was entitled to receive, and that therefore the Chigago and North-western Company ought to have deducted
the amount of such excess from the back charges which it paid
to the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Company, and that
it could not, by improperly paying over that amount to the
first company, acquire any lien on the property as against the
plaintiff for that sum, nor transmit any such lien to the succeeding carriers who might receive it, paying also the same
sum as a part of the back charges.
If the guarantee of the first company had been known to
the others, the question would have been more difficult. Bat
it is not entirely clear to mind that even then the position
of the respondent's counsel would have been correct. If it
could be assumed that the Chicago and North-western Company
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which receivedthe property from the first company, could have
known or readily ascertained the exact amount which the first
company might ultimately be entitled to, after complying with
the guarantee there would be more force in the argument, but
this could scarcely be assumed. There were several succeeding carriers after the Chicago and North-western.
It might
not have known what their usual rate would be. If it had
known this it might not'know whether they would all charge
their usual rates or whether some of them might choose to conform to the rate guaranteed by the first company. It would
seem impossible therefore to be able to adjust the. controversy
between the plaintiff and the first company that might arise on
the guarantee; yet it would be evident on the face of the contract that the plaintiff desired the property to be transported,
and that he contemplated the employment of the succeeding
carriers on the route for that purpose. This the Chicago and
North-western Company would have had the right to assume
even if it had known the exact terms of the contract. It would
also have had the right to assume the plaintiff knew the general custom among carriers so situated, of receiving goods from
each other and paying the back charges, and under such circumstances, it seems to me extremely questionable, whether it
would not be reasonable to say that the second carrier would
have the .right to receive the goods, paying the back charges
demanded by the first, as though its guarantee was to be complied withby the other companies, leaving the plaintiff to resort
to his contract to recover whatever he might be entitled to
when the fact should be ultimately ascertained. But as this,
question is not presented, I will not pursue it further. It is concededhere that the other companies,after the first,had noknowledge of the contract between the first and the plaintiff. Upon
these facts it seems to me clear that the carriers who have acted
in accordance withthe usual general custom, which theplaintiff
is presumed to have known, and probably did well know in
fact, ought to have their lien for the ordinary back charges
paid by them. It would be unreasonable when nothing accompanies the goods, to notify them of the fact, to require them
to ascertin at their peril whether there was any secret stipu-
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latior. between the owner and some prior carrier, from whom
they nave been received, which might ultimately prevent him
from being entitled to the ordinary rates. It is not like the
case of goods being delivered to a carrier by a person having
no authority to deliver them, and then the carrier claiming
a lien for the charges as against the true owner. Some cases
have held that then the carrier has no lien because the owner's
title cannot be thus divested or encumbered. It is not a case
where the goods have been diverted from their true destina
tion ; on the contrary the goods have been transported over the
whole route exactly in accordance with the authority andintention of the owner. It is a mere question when the owner has
taken a guarantee from the first carrier, that the through rate
shall not exceed a certain sum, whether the others having no
knowledge ofit are not entitled to act upon the general custom.
It seems to me that they are, and that it is more reasonable to
impose on the owner, who, knowing the custom, carries the
goods to be delivered to the carriers, without notifying them
of his secret contract, the burden of resorting to the company
with which he contracted than to impose on the carriers the
burden of ascertaining at their peril all the secret agreements
between the shipper and prior carriers, from whom the goods
are received, affecting their right to receive the ordinary
freights. The custom under which these carriers acted is
more for convenience of shippers than for the carriers. It enables property to be transported over long routes, composed
of many distinct corporations and lines, with great safety and
dispatch, and without the necessity of employing any intermediate agents other than the carriers themselves. If, therefore,
the risk is to be imposed on each to ascertain at its peril
whether there are any secret agreements affecting the liabilities of goods received in the ordinary course of business, to the
ordinary freights, this liability must result in brieaking up the
custom, and thus tend greatly to the public inconvenience.
Upon the facts found, the defendants were entitled to their
lien for the back charges. The judgment should be reversed,
and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment for
the defendants.
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We have received a copy of the foregoing opinion from an educated member of the profession, who is not, in
any sease, connected with the suit,
or with any suit involving a similar
question. He seems to feel that the
decision is intenselywrong. We should
not be surprised to have the plaintiff
in the action feel so. After having
made the express contract with the
first carrier to have his goods transported over the whole line for a certain freiglt, to be compelled, at the
end of the route, to pay more or not
obtain his goods, and then to be coolly
referred to the first company for redress, is rather calculated to excite
surprise in the mind of a plain man.
Itseems not to be giving him the full
benefit of his contract. If he had
been told by the first company that
such would have been the result, he
could not complain. But unless so
told he would naturally expect the
companies -to arrange that among
themselves. And it seems to us that
we should have preferred such a result,
as being both more reasonable and
more just.
These questions are decided so much
upon construction, and are made to
depend so much upon the views the
court take of the convenience of the
parties, in regard to business, that
there seems danger, sometimes, lest
we should lose sight of all definite
rules of law affecting the questions
involved. There is some danger, too,
we sometimes fear, that in looking so
constantly and carefully after the con.
venience of these extensive railway
combinations we might come at last
Altogether to ignore the interests, the

It seems to be settled that if the
freight is paid through to the first
carrier in a line of successive carriers,
but the goods are forwarded by another line, and the prepaid freight not
credited, and the back freight is, in
consequence, advanced by the last
carrier in the line, he will have no
right to detain the goods until the
freight advanced by him is paid:
.
Fitch v. .hewburyj 1 Doug. (Mich.)
And the carrier who transports goods,
at the instance of a wrong-doer, has
no lien upon them for the freight
earned by himself, or advanced to
others: ?obinson v. Baker, 5 Cush.,
137; S'teves v. B. dfe W. .Paw., 8

Gray 262.
And it seems to us that these decisions establish the point that the
carrier, both as to his own freight and
that which he advances to other carriers, must see to it that the transportation is with the consent and upon the
credit of the owner; and that he cannot turn such owner over to another
party for his indemnity. He must
see to it, himself, that the transportation is not, in any sense, or to any
extent, in conflict with the tights of
the owner of the goods. And these
rights of the owner must be defined,
not only by his powers, as owner of
the goods, but by his action in regard
to them. His consent to have them
carried at all must be shown; the
direction in which the owner consents
to have them carried, and the terms
of the transportation must all be
shown by the consent of the owner,
either express or implied. If the
owner directed the goods carried to
one point, the carrier could not give
convenience, and ultimately, the rights any right to freight, even to subseof those who have to employ them, quent carriers, by sending them !n
by a sort of compulsion, growing out another direction. Nether could a
warehouseman or carrier, with whom
of the necessities of business.
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gobda were left for safe-keeping, give
any right to demand freight to carriers
who should carry them eithe, without
any directions, or by the direction of
the warehouseman of the first carrier.
In short, it seems to us, it must be
regarded as entirely well settled that
the first carrier of goods in a line
consisting of successive carriers, Is in
no sense the implied agent of the

whether made known to them or not.
If not made known to them it is the
fault of their own agent, and they
cannot visit it upon the other party
unless there is some fraudulent concealment on his part, of which there
is no pretense here. It seems to us
the first carrier is prima facie competent to bind the other carriers by contracts as to the amount of freight, and
owner of the goods; but that he is that the case was with the plainti
L F. 3L
the implied agent of the line of carriers, and his contract will hind them

Supreme Court of New Jer3ey.
CUFF? ADMINISTRATRIX OF CUFF, V'. TUE NEWARK AND NEW
YORK RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
The rule is now firmly established that, when the owner of lands undertakes to do a work, which, in the ordinary mode of doing it, is a nuisance, he
.e liable for any injury, which may result from it to third persons, though the
work Is done by a contractor exercising an independent employment, and employing his own servants; but when the work is not in itself a nuisance, and
the injury results from the negligence of such contractor or his servants in the
manner of executing it, the contractor alone is liable unless the owner is in
default In employing an unskillful or improper person as the contractor.
The principle upon which the superior, who has contracted with another,
exercising an Independent employment, for the doing of the work, is exempt
from liability for the negligence of the latter in the execution of it. applies as
between the contractor and his sub-contractor.
Damage to be recovered must be both the natural and proximate consequence from the wrong complained of, and not from the wrongful act of a
third party remotely induced thereby.
The intervention of the independent act of a third person, between the
wrong complained of and the injury sustained, which act was the immediate
cause of the injury, is made a test of that remoteness of damage which forbids
recovery.
The N. & N. Y. R. R. Co. contracted with F. & Co. for the graduation of their
road bed. With the consent of the company, F. & Co. sub-contracted the rocr
excavation with one S. Befor the sub-contract was made, it was understood
by the contractors, and by the officers of the company, that the rock would be
removed by S., by blasting with nitro-glycerine; a magazine for storing the
nitro-glyeerine necessary for that purpose, was located on the company's land
under the direction of their engineer.
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By the contract between the company and F & Co. the contractors were
forbidden to sub-let without the company's consent, and were required to dis.
charge incompetent and disorderly workmen when required so to do by the
company's engineer. S., without the knowledge or consent of the company,
stored in the magazine certain cans of glycerine which belonged to the U. S.
Blasting Co., and which he kept there for sale on the orders of the blasting
company. An order for glycerine being sent to S. by the blasting company,
his foreman directed B., one of his employees, to fill the order. B., in doing so,
removed one of theblasting company's cans from the magazine a distance of 150
yards, but not off the railroad company's lands, and there, by his negligence.
aaexplosion occurred, by which the deceased was killed. B. wasemployed by
S. specially to take charge of the nitro-glycerine in the magazine, and was an
incompetent person for that business. In an action against the railroad company and F. & Co., the contractors, by the administratrix ofthe deceased, torecover damages for his death: H1eld,
1. That the stipulations in the contract between the railroad company and
the contractors, as to sub-contracting, and the removal of incompetent em.
ployees, did not create the relationof master and servant between the railroad
company or F. & Co., and the servants of the sub-contractor; nor raise a duty
for the non-performance of which an action could be maintained by third persons against the railroad company, or F. & Co., for injuries resulting from the
negligence of an employee of the sub-contractor.
2. That the permission of the company that S. might use their lands for a
magazine in which to store oil necessary for the operations of blasting on the
work, did not authorize him to use them for the purpose of engaging in a traf.
flc in oil which belonged to others.
3. That the company were not answerable for injuries to thirdpersons, which
happened through the negligence of a servant of S., in the management of
nttro-glycerine, which belonged to another company engaged in the maunfacture of that article, and which had been clandestinely stored In the magazine by S., and vas kept by him for sale on the orders of its owners, without
the knowledge of the company.

Tis was an action on the case to recover damages for the
death of the plaintiffs husband, under the Act of March 3d,
1848.
At the trial before the Hudson Circuit, the plaintiff recovered a verdict against all the defendants, with an assessment of damages at $3,000. A rule to show cause why the
verdict should not be set aside was allowed by the justice
oefore whom the cause was tried.
J P. Jackson and J. F. Randolph for the rule.
S. B. Ransom and C. 0. Beaman of NV. Y. contra.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEPuE, J.-The reason mainly relied on for making the rule
absolute is, that the plaintiff failed to establish the liability of
rhe defendants for the wrongful act or neglect from which the
.death resulted. The Newark and New York Railroad Company, at the time in question, were engaged in constructing a
railroad from Newark to Jersey City. The injuries which the
deceased sustained were received upon that part of the work
which was known as section four. The gradation and masonry
upon that section were contracted for by the company with
the other defendants, who were partners under the name of
"Flanagan and Sage." Flanagan and Sage had, withthe consent of the company, sub.contracted the rock excavation to
oie T. P. Shaffner, and it was understood by all parties, before
the contract was made with Shaffner, that the rock was to be
removed by blasting with the use of nitro-glycerine. The
negligence from which the death of the deceased resulted,
was that of one Burns, in the use of nitro-glycerine on the
premises owned by the company. Burns was an employee
of Shaffner, the sub-contractor, selected by him for the par-,
ticular duty of taking charge of the nitro-glycerine used on

the works.

After the sub-letting to Shaffner, he applied to

the engineer of the company for permission to occupy a portion of their land, upon which he might erect a magazine in

which to store the oil necessary for executing the work of
blasting. The permission was granted, and the magazine was
tocated by the directions of the company's engineer.
The contract between Flanagan and Sage and the compvy
contained the following clauses: "The contractor shall not be
at liberty to sub-let any part of the work without the consent
of the engineer; no sub-contract, however, shall relieve the
contractor of his liabilities under this contract should the sub3ontractor fail to perform the work undertaken by him." "The
2ontractor shall employ a competent foreman and workmen,
and experienced mechanics; and he shall immediately discharge,
whenever required to do so by the engineer, any men considared by the engineer to be incompetent and disorderly, or
disposed to foment discontent or mischief on the work"
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These provisions were not incorporated in the oontract of
Flanagan and Sage with Shaffner, except that it was declared
therein that Shaffner should have the same privileges that
were enjoyed by Flanagan and Sage in the use of the railroad company's grounds for the constructing of houses, shops,
etc., required for the carrying on of the said blasting.
It will be assumed on the present occasion, in order to reach
at once the merits of the controversy, that the magazine, as
located, when used for the storage of nitro-glycerine, was a
public nuisance; -and that the engineer of the company was
their agent in consenting to that use of their lands; and that
Burns was an improper person, by reason of habits of intoxication, to be entrusted with the handling of the highly dan.
gerous article of which he had the charge; and that he"was
intoxicated at the time of the accident. This concession ob.
viates the necessity of examining the evidence bearing upon
disputed questions of fact, and resolves the inquiry into a c6n.
sideration of pare questions of law, upon facts not in dispute.
The liability of the company to respond for the injuries
received by the deceased, was sought to be placed on two
grounds: First, That Burns, under the circumstances of this
case, was the servant of the company; and second, That the
injury resulted from a nuisance, erected and maintained on
their lands by their consent.
In Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404, it was held that the
owner of lands was liable for all injuries resulting from the
negligence of employees engaged in executing work upon the
land, though the work was done by a contractor who had
contracted to do the work, and who employed the servant
through whose negligence the injury happened. In that case,
the action was against the owner of lands for causing a quantity of lime to be placed on the highway, by means of which the
plaintiff and his wife, in driving along the highway, were overturned and much injured. The defendant, having purcnased
a hnuse by the roadside, contracted with a surveyor to put it
in repair for a stipulated sum. A carpenter, having a contract
under the surveyor to do the whole business, employed a brick.
laver under him, and he again contracted for a quantity of
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lime with a lime-burner, by whose servant the lime in question
iwas laid in the road. The defendant was held liable. After
a recognition as authority for a time: Bush v. Steinman was
overruled. At first, its guthority was restricted to liability for
negligence in relation to real estate, making a distinction in
this respect between the owners of real and personal property;
finally this distinction was abandoned, and the authority of
Bush v. Steinman was completely denied, and no case which
was once esteemedasauthority has been more completely overthrown: Quarman v. Burnett, 6 I. & W. 499; Hobbit v.
The -London & Y W. B.R. Co., 4 Exch. 254; Painter v.
Pittsburg,46 Penn. 213 ; Blake v. Ferris,5 N. Y. 48; Pack,
v. The City of . Y., 8 N. Y. 222; Hilliard v. Richardson,

3 Gray 349. All the cases on this subject are collected in a note
to the case of Painterv Pittsburg,in 3 Am. Law Reg., N. S.
358; and see also the American Note to Holiday v. St. Leon.
ards, 11 0. B., N. S. 209; 1 Redfield on Railways, sec. 129;
Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, see. 79.
The rule is now firmly established that where the owner of
lands undertakes to do a work, which, in the ordinary mode of
doing it is a nuisance, he is liable for any injuries which may
result from it to third persons, though the work is done by a
contractor exercising an independent employment and employing his own servants. But when the work is not in itself a
nuisance, and the injury results from the negligence of such
contractor or his servants in the execution of it, the contractor
alone is liable, unless the owner is in default in employing an
unskillful or improper person as the contractor: Ellis v. Sheffeld Gas Consumers' Co. 2 E. & B., 767; Peachy v. Rowland,
13 0.B. 182; Hole v. S. & S. Railway Co, 6 H. & N. 488.
Steel v. The S. E. Railway Co., 16 0. B. 550; Bapson v.Oubi
9 I. & W. 710; Reedie v.London& N. W.R.R. Co.,4 Exch.
244; Knight v. Ford, 5 Exch. 721; Milliganv. Wedge, 12
A. & E. 737; Overton v. Freeman, 11 0. B. 867; Packardv.

,Ymith, 10 0. B. N. S. 470-480; Allen v. Hayward 7 Q. B.
960; Chicago City v. Bobbins, 2 Black, 418,2 Am. aw Reg.,
N. S. 529 ; Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Scammon v
City
Chicago, 25 Ill. 424; ATfcGui;re v. Grant, 1 Dutch 356
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The counsel oftheplaintiff, on the argument, did not attempt
to sustain or resuscitate Bush v. Steinman for the support of
this branch of their case. With much ingenuity they argued
that the exemption of the owner from liability from the negligence of the servants of the contractor, arose from the fact that
he had no control over the servant; and no power to discharge
an incompetent person who was employed by the contractor,
and hence their reasoning was, the company are not within
the reason of this exemption, because of the stipulations in the
contract requiringtheir consent to a sub-letting, and authorizing
them to require the discharge of any. person employed on the
work, considered by the engineer to be incompetent. The fa].
lacy of this argument lies in avoiding the real subject of inquiring, and in assuming an erroneous principle as the foundation of the maxim respondant superior. The point of the inquiry
is not under what circumstances is the owner, who contracts for
the execution of work on his lands, exempt from liability for
thenegligence of employees of the contractor. It consists in the
search for the principle upon which one man incurs a liability
for an act not done byhimself. That liability flows from the relation of master and servant, a relation incident to which is the
power to select the servant, and direct himin the execution of
the duties of his employment, and to discharge him when found
to be incompetent; and also the duty to so controlhis acts that
no injurymaybe done to third persons. In Quarmanv.Bumett,
6 M. &W. 499, PARKE, B., in delivering the opinion of the court
(page 509), says, that "upon the principle that qui facit Per
aliumfacit per se the master is responsible for the acts of his
servant; and that person is undoubtedly liable who stood in
the relation of master to the wrong-doer, he who had selected
him as his servant, from the knowledge or belief in his skill and
care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose
orders he was bound to receive and. obey. But the liability by
virtue of the principle of the relation of master and servant
must eease where the relation itself ceases to exist, and no other
person than the master of such servant can be liable, on the
simple ground that the servant is the servant of another, and
his act the act of another." Substantially the same views
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were expressed by Mr. Justice MULLETT, in Blake v.Ferris,1

Seld. 54. In McGuire v. Grant, 1 Dutch. 371, Mr. Justice
ELmER says "a master is responsible for the tortious acts of
his servant, which were done in his service. This responsibility grows out, is measured by, begins and ends with his control over them. If it is his duty to control them, in what they
do, he is responsible for his neglect. But where workman do
not stand in such relation to the person soughtto be charged,
as to make it his duty to control them, they are not his servants, and he is in nowise responsible for their acts, except in
some cases, where by subsequently adopting and sanctioning
those acts he renders himself, legally, a participator in them."
There are cases in which persons have contracted to have
work done have been held liable for negligence in the manner
of doing it; but those are cases in which the contract created
only the ordinary hiring for service, or the party who let the
work retained and exercised the control and direction of the
employees by whom the manual labor was done, or personally
participated in the wrong complained of: Randlekson v.Mfurray,
8-A. & E. 109; Sadler v.Renlock, 4 E & B. 570; Buyers v.
Gray, 1 0. B. 578; Fenton v. Dublin Steam Packet Co., 8 A.

& E. 835.
These cases do not infringe upon the rule that the relation
of master and servant must substantially and really exist, in
order to raise a liability on the part of the former, for the negligent acts of the latter; on the contrary, they recognize the
rule and deduce the liability from the fact that the employees
doing the work were really the servants of him under whose
directions they were engaged in executing it, or the entire control of the work to be done had not been abandoned to the
contractor.
There is another class of cases in which municipal corpora.
tions have been held answerable for the negligence of the servants of their contractors in making excavations in the public
streets; and railroad companies have been held for damages
sustained by passengers by reason of defects in the platforms
of their depots, occasioned by the carelessness of employees of
contractors, to wh, m the work of construction had been let.
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These cases do not rest on the relation of master and servant
The obligation results from another principle: from the duty,
in the one instance, to see that the streets are kept safe for the
passage of persons and property, and in the other, to provide
for passengers a safe means of access to and from the cars-a
duty independent of the means by which the obstructions or
defects were occasioned: Storrs v. City of atica,17 N. Y. 104;
Chicago City v. Bobbins, 2 Black, 418; Holmes v. The AT E.
Railway Co., L. R., 4 Exch. 251:; Gillis v. Railway Co., 8
American Law Reg., N. S. 729 - Smith v. Doccs Co., L. R., 3
C. P. 326.
Except under the special circumstances above indicated
(none of which exist in his case) the rule is invariable, that
the master only is responsible for the acts of the servant.
In some cases it is difficult "to say whose servant a person
is that does the injury; when you decide that, the question is
solved:" WLIAMs, J., Milligan v. W'edge, 12 A. & E. 737.
In Quarman v. Burnett, the defendants who were the owners of a carriage, and were accustomed to hire horses to draw
it for a day, or a drive, of a liveryman, who provided a driver
were held not liable for an injury done to a third person through
the negligence of the driver, although they provided him with
a livery and paid him a fixed sum for each drive. In that case
there was some evidence that the defendants had selected the
particular driver. On this latter point Baron PARKE says:
"If the driver be the servant of a job master, we do not think
he ceases to be so by reason of the owner of the carriage preferring to be driven by that particular servant where there is
a choice amongst more, any more than a pack post-boy ceases
to be the servant of an inn-keeper where a traveler has a particular preference of one over the rest on account of his sobriety and carefulness; if, indeed, the defendants had insisted upon
the horses being driven not by one of the regular servants, but
by a stranger to the job master, appointed by themselves, it
would have made all the difference." The employment of an

engineer by a company having work done under a contractor
to superintend it and direct what shall be done, will n )t make
the company liable for negligence in the manner of doing the
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work, though it was directed to be done by him: Steel v. S. E.
Railway Co., 16 0. B. 550; Brown v. Accrington Cotton Co.,
H. & 0. 511, 519; Pack v. fayor of X. . ty, 4Seld.
222; Kelly v. Same, 1 Kernan 433. In Walker v. Goe, 3 H.
& N. 395 (in error, 4 H. & N. 350), the Act of Parliament
empowering the defendants, commissioners, to lease a canal,
authorized and required the commissioners to give notice to
the lessees, if during the term they should permit the navigation to be out of repair, requiring that the necessary repairs
Ihould be commenced, proceeded with and finished within reasonable periods to be named by the commissioners, and if the
]- sees should neglect to commence, proceed with, or finish such
repairs in the manner so specified, then the said commissioners
were authorized to take possession of the tolls and other proceeds of the said navigation, and to cause such repairs to be
done under their own direction and to pay the necessary expenses thereof out of the said tolls and other proceeds. The
canal was leased and by the default of the lessee one of the
locks became dilapidated and out of repair, and fell in, in consequence of which the navigation was suspended and the bafge
of the plaintiff was delayed. The condition of the lock was
known to the commissioners a sufficient time before it fell in
to enable them to give the notice, and for the performance of
the repairs, and they failed to give the notice. It was held by
the colrt that whatever the obligation might be as between
the dommissioners and the public to keep the canal open, the
commissioners were not liable to the plaintiff for his loss, be.
cause of the non-exercise of their powers to correct the fault
of the lessee in the management of the property leased to him.
The case of Blake v. Ferrisis an illustration of the inability
of third parties to take advantage of stipulations inserted in
the contract for the protection of the parties to it, or out of
abundant caution to provide for any contingent injuries that
might occur. It was there held that a provision in a license
or grant by municipal authorities to persons to construct at
their own expense a sewer in a public street, "that the grantees
should cause proper guards and lights to be placed at the excavations, and should be answerable for any damage or injuries
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which might be occasioned to persons, animals or property, in
the construction of the sewer," did not enure to the benefit of a
stranger so as to render the grantees liable to him for the negligence of agents for whose conduct they would not otherwise
be responsible. See also Pack v. City of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 222.
.A case directly in point with that under consideration will
be found in Reedie v. Railway Co., 4 Exch.' 244. That was
an action by the administratrix of a person who was killed
while'passing under a viaduct in the course of construction as
part of the defendants' railway. The work of constructing the
viaduct had been let by contract, and the injury which occasioned the death happened throughthe carelessness of the contractor's servants in permitting a large stone to fall on the
deceased. By the terms of the contract between the company
and the contractor, they had a general right of watching the
progress of the work, and if the contractors employed incompetent workmen the company had the power of dismissing
them. The court held that the company were not liable, and
in pronouncing judgment ROLFE, B., said: "Our attention was
directed during the argument to the provisions of the contract,
whereby the defendants had the power of insisting on the
removal of careless or incompetent workmen, and so it was
contended they must be responsible for their non-removal; but
this power of removal does not seem to us to vary the case.
The workman is still the servant of the contractor only, and
the fact that the defendants might have insisted on his removal
if they thought him careless or unskillful, did not make him
their servant." In State v. Williams, 1 Vroom 102, this court
held that a landlord did not make himself responsible for the
nuisance of his tenant in keeping the house in a disorderly
manner by a failure to avail himself of the power to expel the
tenant by summay proceedings for the non-payment of rent,
according to the terms of the letting. Indeed, in the ordinary
case of the hiring of a coach from a livery, the hirer has the
power to terminate the relation between himself and the servant
who drives him, at any moment, by relinquishing the journey
a fid ordering the coach back to the owner. That power, though
the decision as to whether it shall be exercised or not lies in
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his own breast, has never been urged as an argument for holding him liable for the negligent act of the driver, although he
may choose to prosecute his journey with an incompetent
coachman. The power to discharge in such a case is a power
which exists for his own protection, which he is not bound to
exercise for the protection of third persons.
The stipulations in the contract between these defendants
are of the same nature with the power last adverted to. They
were designed for the benefit of the company, tb enable them
to determine whether the work should be sub-let or not, and
to prevent the annoyances and delays incident to disorders
fomented by evil-disposed workmen among their fellows, and
the loss and injury resulting from insufficient or improper
execution of the work. Their office was not to create obligations or duties on the part of the company to third persons.
The obligation lies in contract. No stranger can maintain
an action on the contract. It does not create the relation ot
master and servant, nor raise a duty from the non-performance of which an action will enure to third persons.
The principle upon which the superior who has contracted
with another, exercising an independent employment for the
doing of the work, is exempt from liability for the negligence
of the latter in the execution of it, applies as between the contractor and his sub-contractor: Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W.
710; Knight v. Ford, 5 Exch. 721; Overton v. Freeman, 11
C. B. 867.
The verdict cannot be sustained against any of the defendants on the first ground on which their liability is endeavored
to be supported. It remains to be considered whether they
can be held on the other position taken by counsel.
The company did not use the premnis es, except as they were
occupied by the contractors in the execution of the work.
They were not then in that actual possession which would
raise a liability for acts done upon the property, without regard to the agency by which they were done. They can only
be held for what they contracted to have done, and consented
that others should do upon their property.
The consent of the company was that the magazine should
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be used for the storage of the nfitro-glycerine, necessary for the
operations of blasting on the works. At the time of the accident, there was in the magazine only one can of nitro-glycerine,
containing about ten pounds, which belonged to Shaffner, for
that purpose. Without the knowledge of the engineer or any
officer of the company, or of Flanagan and Sage, Shaffner had
stored in the magazine sixteen cans of the oil, which belonged
to the United States Blasting Company, and which had been
removed clandestinely from the County of Bergen, to avoid an
execution about to be issued against that company, and secreted
by Shaffner in the magazine, and kept there for sale on the
orders of the company. Of these things the defendants were
entirely ignorant. On the occasion of the accident, one Merritt came to the premises with an order signed by a director of
the blasting company, for thirty pounds of glycerine. Burns
at that time had quit the duties of his ordinary employment,
and had gone to bed. Nicholas, the foreman of Shaffner,
waked him up, and directed him to fill the order. In obedience to his command, Burns procured from the magazine a can
of the blasting company's oil and an empty can, and carried
them a distance of about 150 yards, near to the blacksmith's
shop, and proceeded to open the can containing the-oil. While
so doing the explosion took place, from which the death of
the deceased resulted.
In the aspect in which this case has been considered, the liability of the railroad company is fixed, if the injury complained
of was the legalresult of the nuisance to which they consented.
The law cannot undertake to trace back the chain of causes
indefinitely, for it is obvious that this would lead to inquiries
far beyond human power and wisdom, in fact, infinite in their
scope. It therefore stops at the first link in the chain of causation, and looks only to the person who is the proximate cause
of the injury : Sheraman & Redfield on Negligence, sec. 9.
The general rule is that the damage to be covered must be
the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained
of: 2 Greenleaf, Ev., sec. 236. "It is not enough if it be the
natural consequence, it must be both naturaland proximate :"
BYILEs J., in Richardson v. Dunn, 8 C. B., N S. 665. To
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maintain an action for special damages, theymustbe thelegal
and natural consequence arising from the tort, and not from
the wrongful act of a third party remotely induced thereby:
Crainv. Petree 6 Hill 522. It is true that where the injury
results from the negligence of several persons, differing only in
degree, each will be held responsible for the entire damages
resulting therefrom; but where the injury immediately results
from the act of one of the parties, the other, though blamable,
cannot be held liable for it, unless his conduct is so connected
with the act of the former, that it may be said to have been
directly the cause of it. Cases may be stated where the wrongful conduct of one person affords the opportunity or occasion
for the illegal act of another, or for an injury from other
causes. In such cases the injury is too remote to sustain anac.
tion for the recovery of damages. Thus the proprietors of a
railroad, who negligently delay the transportation of goods delivered to them as common carriers and then transport
them safely to their destination, are not responsible for injuries to the goods by a flood, while in their depot at that
place, although the goods wouldnot have been exposed to such
injury but for the delay: Denny v. TheN. Y. Cent. B.R. Co.
13 Gray 481; Yorrison v. Davis, 20 Penn. 171.

The gravamen of the complaint is a public nuisance, and to
sustain an action for a public nuisance, the plaintiff must prove
an injury therefrom, personal and peculiar to himself, beyond
the injury to the public at large which can only be redressed
by indictment.
In this respect the action is analogous to actions for words
where special damage is necessary to support the action.
The leading case on this subject is Vicar v. Wilcox, 8 East.
1. The defendant there had charged the plaintiff with cutting
his cordage on his rope walk. The special damages alleged
were that the employer of the plaintiff believing the charge to
to be true, discharged him, and that the plaintiff afterward applied to R. P. for employment, who refused to employ him in
consequence of the words, and because his former master had
discharged him for the offense imputed to him. The plaintiff
was non.suited, because the injury was too remote to sustain
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the action, and the non-suit was sustained by'the court in
bane.
As far as respects the denialof the plaintiff's right to recover
damages for his discharge by his master, if such discharge was
caused by the words communicated by the defendant himself
to the master, Vicar v. Wilcox cannot be reconciled with the
earlier as well as later authorities, but if the words were cornmunicated to the employer by the unauthorized act of third
persons, that case has been completely sustained: see 2 Smith's
L. Cases, 6 Ed., 532, note to Vicar v. Wilcox; Lumley v. Gasc,

2 E. & B., p. 237; 1 Starkie on Slander, 205; 2 id., 64; Ward
v. Weeks, 7 Bing., 211. In the case last cited, it was held that in
an act of slander the allegation of special damage could not be
supported by proof that the defendant had spoken the words
to B., and that damage ensued in consequence of R'.s repeating them as the words of the defendant. In delivering judg.
ment, TINDAL, 0. J., says, "Every man must be taken to be
answerable for the necessary consequences of his own wrongful acts; but such a spontaneous and unauthorized communicationcannot be considered as the necessary consequence of thr
original uttering of the words. For no effect whatever followed
from the first speaking of the words to Bryce; if he had kept
them to himself, Bryer would still have trusted the plaintiff
It was the repetition of them by Bryce to Bryer, which waa
the voluntary act of a free agent, over whom the defendant
had no control, and for whose acts he is not answerable, that
was the immediate cause of the plaintiff's damage."
In Bich v. Basterfield, 9 C. B., 783, the owner of premises
built a chimney upon it and leased the premises. The tenant
after he entered lighted a fire, from the smoke of which the
plaintiff was injured in his occupation of adjoining premises,
and sued the owner to recover damages on the ground that
having erected the chimney and let the premises with the
chimney so erected, he had impliedly authorized the lighting
of a fire therein. It was heid that the injury resulted from
the act of the the tenafit, and the action would notliealthough,
as said by CRESswELL, J., the defendant "enabled the tenant
to make fires if he pleased."
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In other cases the intervention of the independent act of a
third person between the wrong complained of and the injury
sustained, which was the immediate cause of the injury, is
made a test of that remoteness of damage which forbids its
recovery: Ashley v. Harrison,1 Esp. 48, A4'lne v. Smith, 2
Dow. Parl. Rep. 390; Fitzsimons v. Inlis,5 Taunt.533; Hoey
v. Fetbon, 11 0. B., N. S. 142; Daniels v. Potter, 5 0. & P.
262; Hadlan v. Lott, 15 0. B. 411; Walker v. Goe, 4 H. &
N. 350, Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & 0. 152; Grain v. etie, 6
Hill 522; Stevens v. Hadtwell, 11 Met. 542; Toomey v. Railway Co., 3 0. B., N. S. 145.
Tested by the principle above stated, it is obvious that the
injury received by the deceased, from which death resulted,
is too far removed from the act of the company to impose a
liability for it upon them. It did not result naturally or proximately from the nuisance they permitted on their lands, but
was caused directly by the unauthorized and independent act
of a third person intervening between the nuisance they conrented to and the injury.
Shaffner had clandestinely applied the magazine to a use
for which he had not the permission of the company, and engaged in a business which was not connected with his contract.
Permission to use their lands for the limited purpose of
storing materials for the execution of the work, did not authorize him to use them for the purpose of engaging in a dangerous traffic, in the prosecution of which the injury resulted. It
cannot be insisted therefore that the liability of the defendants
flows from their consent to the use of their lands for the business in which Burns was employed when the accident happened
The nuisance relied on to fix the defendants, is the storage of
nitro-glycerine in the magazine, by their consent. The injury was not caused by an explosion in the magazine. Burns
had removed the can from the magazine a distance of 150
yards. If he had taken it on the work, to use it in blasting,
and, there, persons had been injured by his negligence, the
company could not be held for the injuries, notwithstanding
their consent to the use and storage of nitro-glycerine on
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their premises, for the prosecution of the work, unless its use
in blasting was a nuisance. The disconnection of his act from
the nuisance of the storage of the oil, to which the company
had consented, is the more apparent when it is considered that
the oil in the management of which the explosion occurred,
was kept in the magazine without the knowledge of the company, and that the disaster happened in a business which
Shaffner was not authorized to engage in on the company's
land. Between his act and their illegal act there was no such
connection that the latter can be said to have been the cause
of the former.
A places a log in the highway, which B casts into an adjoining close-or puts an obstruction upon the sidewalk, which
passers-by throw into the roadway of the street, and a traveler is injured by coming in contact with it, A cannot be held for
the trespass in the one case, nor for the injury'in the other.
Or, to take an illustration more nearly connected with the facts
of the case, supposeBurns, by command of Shaflfier, had carried
the can to Jersey City, and there by his negligence it had exploded and injury had resulted, could an action be maintained
against the company for such injuries, based upon an allegation of liability, arising from a nuisance which consisted in the
storing of the explosive on their lands at Bergen. If not, it
is manifest that the action in this case cannot be supported.
That the injury happened on their lands can make no difference, if the business in the prosecution of which it resulted
was transacted there by Shaffuer, without the authority of the
company. If the case-was shown that they had consented to
the use of their land for the traffic in which Shaffner had engaged, they might have been held for any injuries that resulted
immediately in connection with the transaction of that business. No such case was made at the trial. The injury was
not caused by the nuisance which had the approbation and
consent of the company. Their consent was to the erection of
a magazine to be used for the limited purpose of storing materials for the necessary operations of their works, in the handling and management of which Burns would have been
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continually under the observation of others engaged on the
works, who would have detected any unfitness for his business arising from intoxication.
At most, consent to the erection of the magazine for that
purpose can only be said to have afforded an opportunity for
the unauthorized act of Shaffner in appropriating it to another
use, and the neglgent act of Burns, who in the law is a stranger
to the defendants, and for whose acts Shaffner alone is responsible.
Rule absolute.
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law," do not apply to proceedings for the assessment and collection of the publicrevenue or the exercise by government of political rights.

THIS was a bill in equity to restrain the collection of taxes
assessed against the complainants as distillers under section 20
of the Act of July 20, 1868. The action was commenced in the
Superior Court of Cincinnati and removed under the statute
to this court, after a restraining order had been granted by
the State tribunal. The respondents demurred.
H. L. Burnett and Stanl-y Mathevs. for complainants.
Warner M. Bateman, U. S. District Attorney, and Stan

berry, for defendants.
ENmoNs, Circuit J.-The complainants, as they were required
to do by section 6 of the law, gave notice that they would ferlWe are indebted to W. AL Bateman. Esq.. U. S.District Attorney, for this

a¢se.-ED. A. L R.
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meat seventy-two hours, and aver they actually employed all
that time, but that the surveyors, in estimating the capacity of
the distillery for purposes of taxation, unlawfully disregarded
the period fixed in the notice, and assumed one of forty-eight
hours only; that this resulted in their determining upon a false
capacity, and provided for the assessor a fictitious basis of taxation. They aver that taxes have been paid in full upon all
their actual production and all which can be produced while
the period of seventy-two hours is employed. They claim,
therefore, that the assessor, by taxing a theoretical production
which they never have produced, has exceeded his jurisdiction,
and the assessment being void, they are entitled to an injunc.
tion, notwithstanding the statute prohibiting its issue; that
the inhibition does not apply when the proceedings are void.
The government claims that the period mentioned in the

notice is not obligatory upon the surveyors, but that it is their
duty to fix upon the most profitable period of fermentation in
order to ascertain the "true producing capacity" of the distillery, as directed by the statute; that when it is thus judicially
ascertained and certified to the assessor, he must, as has been
done, impose a tax of eighty per cent. of what might be pro.
duced had the distillery been run to its full capacity as declared
by the survey. It further claims that the statute prohibiting
an injunction applies; that both the surveyors and assessor had
jurisdiction of the subject, and their proceedings are not nullities, although irregular and illegal.
In the circumstances of this contest it would be beneficial
could the court express an opinion upon the construction of the
statute, accompanied by such reasons as would render it influential. Buf the wide differences at the argument in relation
to facts material to its right interpretation render this impossible. The demurrers, therefore, will b- sustained upon the
ground solely that neither this court nor the State tribunal from
which these causes were removed have any right to restrain
the collection of a Federal tax assessed by an officer having
iurisdiction of the subject, be it never so irregular or erroneous.
This condition of opinion, formed from full recent investigations of this subjectin reference to a different tax, when at the
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bar, was at the opening of the cause announced to counsel.
The argument, of far more than ordinary ability, although
instructive and interesting, has not, so far as this case is concerned, materially changed it.
The accident of a judge's confidence in his opinion has but
little to do with the propriety of judicial discussion. The circumstances attending this litigation, the strong feeling on the
part of the complainants and the fact that a State tribunal of
the highest respectability and influence has granted restraining
orders, would render a brief, unreasoned judgment improper.
Although nearly all of which will be said is familiar to the
experienced lawyer, yet from the probability that its reproduction here will bring it before those classes more immediately
the subjects of this and similar laws, I deem it a duty to do
what otherwise I should say was wholly unnecessary. If the
argument seems extended, it is conceded that collateral circumstances and not the condition of the law warrant it.
I regret now that I conclude to refer to a few books to justify
my judgment, that the learned counsel cited no decisions upon
the first subjedt to be discussed. The complainant assumed
that a clear violation of the statute resulting in an excessive
assessment rendered the proceeding void, and so not a tax
within the meaning of the inhibitory statute. Counsel for the
government assumed as fully the jurisdiction of the assessor,
and treated the degree of illegality as immaterial. Since the
argument, I have been continuously engrossed in other judicial
duties, and have been able to command but a few hours for the
examination of books. I am compelled, therefore, in order to
comply with the request for an early decision, to refer to those
which the accidents of former briefs render accessible. They
are not, perhaps, the most applicable, and such in all cases as a
better opportunity would have selected. They do: however,
illustrate the reasons upon which the decision rests, -and -are
confidently referred to as in accord with a large and prevailing
class of judgments to which they belong.
Section 19 of the Act of July 13, 1866, as amended in 1867,
provides £'that no suit to restrain the assessment or collection
of a tax shall be maintaine I in any court."
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If a statute authorizes an officer to assess generally, except.
ing in plain terms certain persons and things, and the persons
and things are nevertheless taxed in violation of law, has not
the officer so exceeded his power as to render his judgment
void? Can it, in any sense applicable here, be said that he has
jurisdiction of the subject? Courts, in reference to the same
facts, have answered this difficulty according to the purpose
for which the question is asked. If it comes from an officer
executing a .warrant fair on its face, the reply upholds the process and protects .him, although the law forbade its issue. In
these cases it is said the general subject of taxation, and the
judicial duty of determining either upon view or inquiry or
evidence,who and what are within the law; is imposed upon the
assessor ; and an erroneous decision does not for all purposes
render proceeding based upon it void. If an assessment made
inthe same circumstanceis reliedupon to divest a title through
a tax sale, it is declared to be invalid. Owing to the poverty of
language, the same literal reason is given in both instances.
The innocent officer is protected because the assessor has jurisiction, and the title is void because he had none.
It is said a court of equity has not jurisdiction to decree
damages, save as an "incident; yet, if a defendant does not
demur or object at the first opportunity, the jurisdiction is conceded. Here the term means something wholly different from
its sense, when we affirm that the same court has no jurisdiction to.try a citizen for murder, or dissolve a corporation upon
quo warranto. And this is not peculiar to a court of equity.
It is an axiom in this department of the law, that consent cannot confer, jurisdiction, and yet without stopping to call it an
exception, numerous decisions say that even silence will waive
jurisdictional objections. If the power of special tribunals is
made to depend upon preliminary proofs, and on writ of error
t appears they are wanting, it is said they are jurisdictional
fqh.ts, and a reversal follows. In the same class, if the record
does not affirmatively show the error and defendant has
appeared, or the record comes collaterally in question, it is said,
as jurisdiction appears without them, their proof will be presumed: Doughty v. Somerville B. B. Co., 1 Zab. 443; Poaa
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in Moore Touwnahp, 5 Harris, 116; Wight v. Wzrner, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 384; Kennett's Petition, 4 Foster 141; State v. Richmend, 6 Foster 232; Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill. 657; Embury
v. Conner, 3 Comst. 511; Commonwealth v. Henry, 7 Cush:
512; L. ff. B. Co. v. Perrin,16 Ohio 1479.
Numerous judgments fail to indicate the limitations with
which they employ this general term. It use in such manifold significations causes an appearance of conflict beyond
what really exists. Confusion is created only when these
broad generalities are quoted, and sought to be enforced where
they have no application.
These illustrations might be greatly multiplied; they are
entirely familiar, and have been noticed only as the more brief
mode of answering several elementary books where abstractions are found, the literal application of which would warrant
the assumption of the complainants counsel that an assessment in violation of law was an unsurpation of jurisdiction.
Not only is this term employed in so many senses that its
signification is always to be sought in the circumstances of its
use, but no judge has been successful in embodying in a sentence a definition of jurisdiction, universally applicable, even
to a single class of cases. It is always necessary to restrain
the generality, or help out the too limited meaning of words.
The definition has always to be defined. No such attempt will
be made here. Indeed, the necessities of this case will carry
us nowhere near the boundaries of the doctrines which uphold
the doings of quasijudicial officers. Announcing a rule for
the facts in these cases only, it is sufficient that a statute has
authorized the assessor to entertain the general subject of
taxation, that it was in fact entertained, and judgment, lawful
or unlawful, was rendered concerning it. So far as this judgment was concerned, whether unlawful or lawful, is deemed
quite immaterial.
The following judgments show that similar inhibitions have
been applied in all cases where the proceedings were notvoid,
and also as pointedly that those in this case are not so:
In Chegarey v. Jenkins, 1 Seldom. 381, a building, clearly
36
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exempt by law, was assessed, and the collector sued for seizing
property., RuGGLES, Ch. J., says: "The assessor acted judiciarly in deciding whether the plaintiff's building was a dwelling or exempt as a seminary of learning," and proceeds to show
that, although not for all purposes conclusive, it was not void,
and protected the officer. On page 382 it is said the remedy
is under the provisions for appeal.
In Van Rensalaerv. Cottrell, 7 Barb. 129, HARRIS, J., says:

"If the lands were in the town, that gave the assessors jurisdiction of the subject matter. In making the assessment they
performed a judicial act, and no matter how much they erred
in its performance, it cannot render their action void." The
officer collecting the tax was protected. He cites 1 Hill 130.
3 Denio 117, and 'Fan 1?ensalaer v. Witbeck, 7 Barb. 133.

The thing assessed was not, in fact, subject to taxation.
The following judgment is peculiarly applicable to some of
the positions taken in argument in this case: In Van Rensalaer v. Witbec, 7 Barb. 133, statute provided that if- an affidavit was presented of an over-assessment, it, and not the
valuation, should be the guide for taxation. In deciding that
trespass would not lie, Judge HARRIS, p. 137, says: "The
assessors were to ascertain who and what are to be taxed.
This was within their jurisdiction, and as they act judicially, their decision cannot be questioned collaterally, though
they proceed irregularly. Thus, if they should refuse to adopt
the sum stated in the affidavit as required by the statute, it
might furnish ground for reversing their decision, but would
not render the assessment void." He remarks that the departures from the statutory requisites were gross andpalpable.
In The People v. Albany Common Pleas, 7 Wend. 485, a

court martial issued a warrant to collect a fine where the defendant had not been summoned. It was insisted that the
proceedings were void, and the statute prohibiting replevin
did not apply. The court says: "If it appears by the warrant
that the officer is authorized to collect any tax assessed or fine
replevin is not the remaedy to correct his mistakes or trespasses.
The warrant authorized the officer to take the property of

pULLAN V. KISINGER.

Hammond. Whether he had a right to take it cannot be in.
quired into in such an action. The legislature have forbidden
it."
The intimation that the officer would be a trespasser in this
case is probably inadvertent, as the same court, in Savacool v.
Boughton, 5 Wendell 178, had on full consideration decided
the contrary. There a judgment was rendered against the
plaintiff, without summons, in a court not of record, and the
officer who executed the final process was sued. It was held
that although the proceedings were void as between justice
and party, still, when the process was fair on its face, and
gave no notice of the facts showing want of jurisdiction of
the person, the officer was protected. The former cases in
that court are reviewed. Suydam v. Keys, 13 John. 444,
which held a tax collector liable for executing a warrant which
described plaintiffs as residents, when in fact they were nonresidents, and so not subject to tax, is dissented from. Wise
v. Withers, hereafter noticed, 3 Cranch 331, is also disapproved. Beach v. Furman, 9 John. 229, is approved. It is
held that the assessment of a woman not liable to highway
duty was not a void proceeding.
Statutory prohibitions in different circumstances, all applicable here, were enforced, although proceedings were in violation of law, in Keyser v. Waterbury, 7 Barb. 650; Perry v.
Richardson, 9 Gray 216; Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa 383.

In Holt v. Otdwine, 7 Watts 173, replevin was brought for
property seized upon the warrant of a court martial. Plaintiff
was not a member of the troop, and so not subject to duty.
As there was power to judge in the class of offenses, although
gross irregularities characterized the proceedings, and the
plaintiff was not in fact subject to duty, it was said the action
could not be maintained. The same argument made here was
there argued. In O'Ieily v. Good, 42 Barb. 521, property was
seized upon a warrant issued by the United States assessor.
It was claimed the law was unconstitutional, and reple-Vin
brought. The court set aside the writ on motion, saying that
whether the New York statute prohibiting replevin applied to
the case of a federal tax or not, it was unfit such an action

W

PULLAX V. KIMSINGER.

should be maintained. It would defeat, if they were toler
ated, the collection of the national revenues.
The position of the complainants is quite conceded, that
if the proceedings are nullities the statute would have no application. Such are the decisions in the same State tribunals
from which we have quoted. The two classes are by no
means in conflict. See LeRoy v. . S. Railway, 18 Mich.
233; Sto kwell v. Teitch, 15 Abbott Pr. Rep. 412; Hills v.
Martin, 19 John. 7; Macklot v. Davenport,17 Iowa 383. The

concession of the rule contended for is made in most of the
judgments when the statute is applied.
Nearly every State in the Union has similar laws, or has decided
without them that tke common law forbids such a process where
property is in custodia legis. Numerous decisions applying, or
refusing to apply them, have been made, all going upon the
same principle. If there is general jurisdiction in the class
of cases involved, and the tribunal has judicially determined
that the case is within it, the irregularities, however gross, do
not interfere with the application of these prohibitory laws.
The references thus far have been selectedbecause they were
applications of similar statutes. A few additional ones will be
noticed upon the general position that the assessor, within the
most limited sense of the rule, had in this case jurisdiction of
the subject: Telfourd v. Barney, 1 G. Green 581, well lays
down the rule. The petition to sell land omitted a statutory
requisite. The court, adopting what is said in several federal
decisions, say: "They came into court and brought in the subject matter and the court acted. It matters not that it should
have acted otherwise. Had it power to act at all? Could it
have sustained a demurrer to the petition and given judgment
for the defendants? This gives jurisdiction of the case," etc.
Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio State 494 arose upon a sale of
land by administrators. On p. 498-9, the familiar definition
of jurisdiction in U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 709-12 and kindred
cases, is adopted, and after explaining this definition by saying
that in all cases this jurisdiction mustbe made to appearby showing that the law has intrusted the tribunal with the power to
entertain the complaint, that such complaint was presented
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and that under it the person or thing has been brought before
it, the court say: " We wholly dissent from the position taken
in argument that the jurisdiction of the court can be made to
depend on the record's disclosing such a state of facts as to
warrant the exercise of such authority: " Forhees v. Bankc of the
United States, 10 Pet. 449; Grignonv. Astor, 2 How. 339; and
the other cases in the Federal courts, show that if the general
power of judgment is given, and the court decides upon the
sufficiency of the preliminary proof which is necessary right.
fully to launch it, an error in this regard does not render its
judgment void. It is decided in Painev. lforland,15 Ohio
State 435, that if the court acquired jurisdiction by-issuing
process on attachment, and seizes property, although it violated the. statute and rendered judgment without publication,
it was not void. It approves and applies the doctrines of Vorhees v. The Bank, 10 Pet. The court says decidedly the statute
forbade the judgment without publication. For many purposes
ex yvarte statutory assessments, and sales may be attacked
where a similar proceeding after service of process by a court
could not *be. But the difference does not consist in the fact
that one is void, and the other not. Where all is ex parteand
summary with no litigation or appeal, the statute must be complied with, in order to divest a title. It is a rule of protection
applied in that class of cases only. But even in those, notwithstanding irregularities, an officer executing the process
is not subjected to action. He is protected because there is
jurisdiction of the general subject to which his warrant relates, whether it emanates from a court or an assessor; the
proceedings are not nullities if jurisdiction in its broadest
sense exists.
The case of Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331, we are aware,
sustains a different rule. In that a court martial invested with
power to try offenders for neglect of militia duty, in due form
convicted the plaintiff. The Supreme Court holding that he
was exempt under the statute, declared the judgment void for
all purposes, and the innocent officer who executed the process
liable to trespass. This case I do not find directly overr-ldea
in the Supreme Court, but a long series of judgments whoi v
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at war with it have fully established in that court a different
doctrine. It would not now hold any party, much less an offieer, liable in trespass, when a court charged by law with the
duty had judicially determined, upon full hearing, that a person or thing capable in its own nature of being such was the
subject of assessment or flne. It has very frequently been
dissented from by eminent judges and authors. It is somewhat singular that in Dyer v. Homer, 20 H:ow. 65, its correct
general definition is twice referred to without any notice that
its application by Chief Justice MABSHAIL was diametrically
opposed to the argument it is there quoted to illustrate. I
feel warranted in assuming, notwithstanding Wise v. TRithers,
that the Supreme Court would not hold the collector in this
case liable in trespass, even though the assessor directly
violated the statutes, and assessed for a fictitious deficiency,
when none in fact existed.
It is said in answer to this that the Act of 1867 is uncon
stitutional; that it denies due process of law, and substan
tially takes the citizen's property for public uses without
compensation; that it unlawfully confers on others that judicial
power which, under the Constitution, can be confided to the
nurts alone.
In order that we may appreciate fully the inapplicability of
this grave charge against a statute more kindly and liberal in
its provisions, so far as the court's examinations have gone,
than that of any State in the Union for similar purposes, let us
see what is its utmost effect. How far does it change the common law? By thatlaw the citizen could not replevin property
ceized for the collection of a tax. It was deemed impolitic to
suffer such a remedy, and the laws of the States, nearly all of
which have enacted them, declaring the same thing, are but
assertions of this principle. According to the English equity
an injunction would not go in any case at all analogous to that
at bar. Wide as the departures are from these principles in
some of the State courts, all disclaim the jurisdiction per se.
By the rarity and exdeptional character of their interposition
they authorize the assertion of the general rule that there was
no remedy by injunction to prevent the collection of an illegal
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tax. Irrespective of all legislation. there was neither replevin
or injunction. The wrong must be submitted to and suit at
law brought to recover damages for its infliction.
In what, then, is the constitution or the general principles of
good government violated? In order to save the citizen the
delay and expense of a suit to recover back the payment which
he deems unlawful, a speedy and inexpensive appeal is given to
the commissioner, who is directed to refund all moneys paid
upon illegal assessment. If dissatisfied with his decision, the
citizen may sue in the courts, which, up to that of last resort,
are open. He may sue his government as freely as his neighbor, and when judgment is recovered the national treasury is
devoted to its payment. Neither judicial forms or trial by
jury are denied.
When it is added that provisions for appeal and review far
less generous and protective than these, have, in the state tribunals, without exception, been adjudged upon common law
grounds to be exclusive, and that the statute prohibiting an
injunction in this case was wholly unnecessary, enacted only as
a politic and kindly publication of an old and familiar rule, it
would seem as if nothing was left for doubt or discussion.
The argument has not, however, been put in this form for
the purpose of resting it there. If we have misconceived the
nature of these remedies never so much, there is still a broad
margin in the constitutional power of the government ample
to cover any possible difference.
A short history of this subject in the national tribunals will
show there is nothing left for this court to discuss on principle.
All its modifications are settled by express adjudication.
Originally, actions to recover back money exacted for duties
illegally claimed to be due were sustained in the national courts
Elliot v. Swartout, 10 Pet. 137; Bard v. Bart, 13 Id. 236;

Greely v. Burgess, 18 Howard 413, and other cases, so decide.
The Act of March 3,1839, provided that all moneys should be
immediately paid into the treasury, and authorized the secretary to refund all overpayments. There was no express ifihibition of suits again.it the collector. But in Cary v. Curtis,3
How. 236, it was held that its effect was to prevent them. In
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OurtiT v,Fielder,2 Black. 461, the general do.ctrines of Cary
v. Curti are reaffirmed. On page 479, it is said, under the Act
of 1839, importers were not without remedy. If it was shown
more money was paid than was due, the secretary of the trea.
sury was authorized to refund it. The constitutional principles which begat a disagreement in Cary v. Curtiswere more
intelligently discussed and settled in Mkfurray's Lessee v. Hoboken County, 18 How. 272. Under the Act of 1820, authorizing
the secretary of the treasury to issue a distress warrant against
defaulting collectors, land had been sold. The proceeding was
attacked as unconstitutional because no hearing Was given the
defendant and no trial by jury. It was said to be conferring
judicial power upon other than the courts. The law, after the
most full consideration, was held to be valid. It was shown
that like proceedings had immemorially existed in England, and
since magna charta. The distinction was between proceeding,
to ,collect public dues and suits for enforcing private rights.
Numerous instances of similar laws are cited from the several
states having constitutional provisions like those quoted and
relied on by the plaintiff in error.
The unreasonable extension of this doctrine is carefully limited as follows: "To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a
subject, we think proper to state we do not consider that Congress can withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which,
from its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in
equity or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can bring under
the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a
subject for judicial determination. At the same time there are
matters concerning public rights which may be presented in
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, but which Congress may or not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper."
Philadeltphiav. The Collector,5 Wallace 730, was an action
to recover back money paid for taxes. It is said that but for
the authority to sue, given in the statutes, the remedy would
have been confined to an appeal to the commissioner. Justice
CLIFFORD says: "The direction of the statute is, without exception, that all judgments shall he paid by the commissioner
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with costs aud expenses of suit. Parties compelled to pay an
illegal assessment ought to have a convenient remedy to redress the injury; and inasmuch as it is enacted by Congress
that no suit shall be maintained in any court to restrain the
assessment or collection of taxes, it is believed there is no more
appropriate or effectual remedy known to the common lawthau
the action of assumpsit for money had and received as in this
case." In Nicho" v. United States, 7 Wallace 122, the plaintiff
having paid money conceded not to be due, but having omittted
to protest, as provided by the statute, in order to maintain a
suit at law, he brought his action in the Court of Claims. In
deciding that there was no liability on the part of the government, and that the claimant was wholly remediless, pp. 126
and 127, after referring to the rule that the government cannot
be sued without it is in some form authorized by statute, it
says that in this instance, allowing suit at all, even after protest, was "a matter of beneficence, as it confided to the secretary in the first instance to decide upon the amount of duties,
so it might have made him final arbiter in all disputes concerning them." The decision is full that in this class of cases it
is competent to confine the remedy for wrong to the adjudication of the government officers. On pp.130 and 131, it is said:
"If a party complaining of an illegal assement does not appeal
to the court, he is also barred of all right to sue, and he is dlso
barred unless he does so within twelve months. Can it be
supposed that after Congress has carefully constructed a revenue system, with ample provisions to redress wrongs, that it
intended to give the tax payer and importer a further and
different remedy ?" It is added that the mischief which would
result forbids the idea that any other than the prescribed
modes are open for the redress of wrongs.
The judgments leave nothing to decide here. The powerfor this legislation is asserted, and its policy amply vindicated.
The same motive which has induced this seemingly unnecessary argument thus far, prompts the pursuit a little further ot
the suggestion that these principles are not peculiar to the
federal government and courts. They have been applied in
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every State where questions have been raise by the citizens
in reference to any governmental right.
That special remedies by appeal and review, for the correction of erroneous taxation, are always held to be exclusive and
cut off by implication all actions at law and in equity, see
Little v. Greenleaf., 7 Mass. 239 ; How v. Boston Co.,7 Cushing
273; WaterPower v. Boston, 9 Met. 199; 13 Id. 380; Kim-

ball v. Whitewater Co., 1 Carter 285 ; 2 Seldon 258 ; 1 Id. 382.
Simi-lar judgments are very numerous. They apply the rule in
equity as well as at law. In Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penn. State
227, a bill was filed to be released from overtaxation, and dismissed upon the ground that the statute had given a remedy
by appeal. Afcklot Davenport, 17 Iowa 384, was like it.
The bill was dismissed because a special remedy was given,
and the cases at law cited and their rule applied. Dean v.
Todd, 20 Missouri 92, dismissed a bill for like reasons. There
was in neither of these, or the many other similar judgments,
any express prohibition, as has been unnecessarily made by
Congress in this case.
It has been again and again decided, under every variety of
State constitution intended to secure "trial byj ury," "due process of law," and "inviolability of private property," that
the political power may appropriate it by any summary mode
which the wisdom of the legislature may prescribe, and that
neither the nov.elty or the injustice of the form will warrant
judical interference. The following are but a small portion of
the numerousjudgments establishing the principle and illustrating the tendency in our country to question and demand the
reiteration of the oldest and best settled governmental powers:
In Ohio this has often been ruled: Afercer v. Williams,
Wright's Ohio Rep. 132; Bates v. Cooper, 5 Ham. 115;
Williard v. Hamilton, 6 Ohio 454; Symnos v. Cincinnati,14

Ohio; 12 Ohio St. 105. It is repeatedly said in that State
that these constitutional provisions have no influence upon the
power of the State to prescribe rules by which to condemn or
tax the citizen's property. So also, Bubotham v. Afc Clure, 4
Blackf., Ind. 505; Hawkins v. Lawrence, 8 Id. 266; Afc~ormic
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v. Trustees, 1 Carter 48; Canal Co. v. Ferris, 2 Id. 331;.
Bloodqood v. Hohawk Co., 18 Wend. 9; Baker v. Johnson, 2
Hill 342; People v. Hayden, 6 Id. 359; People v. Commic
sioners, 6 Denio 401; Raxford v. Knight, 15 Barb. 627;
Swan v. Williams, 1 Gibbs' Mich. 442; 2fason v. Kennebec
Co., 31 Maine 215; Ligat v. Commonwealth, 19 Penna. St.
456; Yost's Report, 17 Penna. St. 524 ;People v. Wells, 12 Inl.
102; Bradley v. N. Y. & N. H. R.R . Co., 21 Conn. 304;
Clark v. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313; Mayor v. Scott, 1 Penna. St.
309; Jackson v. Winn, Littell, Ky. 322; Gashweller's heirs v.
AVcllvoy, 1 A. K. Marshal 84; Raleigh Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev.
& Batt. 451; R.B. Co. v. Middlesex, 7 Met. 78; People v.
f. S. R. R. Co., 3 Mich. 496; Smith v. McAdam, 3 Mich. 506;
Ht. Washington P. R. Co's petition, 35 New Hamp. 135.
If more plenary forms are accorded by the judicial tribunals,
these and a far greater number of like determinations decide
that it is only because local and exceptional statutory or constitutional provisions expressly secure them. In no instance
have these old and familiar clauses been held to secure such

results.
Michigan, Vermont, New York, and other States, have laws
providing that if property is seized by the collector, in the
possession of adelinquent tax-payer, the true owner shall have
no remedy for it against the officer or the government. He
must look solely to the person for whose tax it was taken. In
others it is provided by law, or ruled upon principle, that if
judgment be rendered against a city or town, any citizen's property may be seized, and he be remitted for reimbursement to a
suit against the municipality. One of these laws was attacked
in Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251. It was claimed that to subject the property of one man to seizure for the tax of another,
for no other reason than because it might accidentally be in his
possession,was in violation of the clauses securing 'trial by jury'
and 'due process of law.' The able opinion of Justice OHRisTI.&NcY, is one of the most interesting and instructive to be found
on this subject. The distinction is drawn between private litigations and those proceedings in which the political power
enforces its claims. Its full history and able argument are full
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to show that in practice these Constitutional provisions never
hiave been, and that public policyforbids they ever should be,
applied in the assessment and collection of the public revenue.
Iii Sheldon v. ]Tanbuswtc, 2 Comst. 478, a similar statute of
New York is referred to in illustration of this general principle.
The whole field of the police power is fertile with pertinent
illustrations of the utter inapplicability of these constitutional
generalities, when the public asserts a right. In Peoplev.H awley, 3 Michigan 330, the defendant owned extensive breweries, which were rendered worthless in a day, by an enactment
making his lawful business a crime; and other cases in that
and other States upon similar 'statutes, and those in reference
to destroying property in cases of conflagration and pestilence, and the promotion by taxation of public improvements
which, by indirect injuries, practically destroy one man's business and give it to another, are familiar instances in which
these general provisions have been invoked again and again,
only to have it repeated that they are of no significance, when
in any form this political right is exercised: See 18 Wend.
127; 2 Denio 461.
A strong illustration of how firmly judicial opinion is fixed
in favor of maintaining to its full extent this necessary public power is found in the stringent construction in favor of
the government, and against the citizen, which has been always given to the clauses in our national and State Constitutions, providing that property shall not be taken for Public
use without compensation. It may be injured indefinitely,
and under this clause it has been held no compensation is due.
A private agreement would not be thus interpreted: See
Sedgwick on Cons. Law 524.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations was cited to show that
the governmental interpretation of the statute might carry even
the taxing power beyond its limit. It is not supposed much
reliance was made upon this, and it would not be noticed, did
not the decisions in reference to the absolute immunity of the
legislature from all judicial control in the whole matter of taxation furnish another numerous list of examples, showing that
these constitutional protections do not control the exercise of

